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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
UNILATERAL CHANGES BY MANAGEMENT AS A




T HIS subject requires consideration first of the subsidiary
question, "Management's Obligation to Bargain, When does
it Begin?" For, obviously, until that basic duty arises, unilateral
action creates no problem at all insofar as this subject is con-
cerned.
It is certain that management need not deal with a union until
negotiations toward a labor contract have been requested.' But
from that point forward unilateral action-by which we mean
changing wages, hours or working conditions without consulting
the bargaining agent-is risky. Ordinarily, when recognition is
not voluntary, an election is held to determine the right of the
union to represent the employees; but employers are not entitled
to have the question of representation resolved in this way as a
matter of absolute right, for if they refuse to recognize merely in
order to gain time in which to destroy, by illegal means, the
union's majority, there may follow an order to bargain even
though no election is held and no offer is or has been made to
prove majority representation, assuming that, in fact, the union
did represent a majority at the time of its demand for recogni-
tion.2 The NLRB has recently, however, in Aiello Dairy Farms,
8
held that, having had knowledge of the company's misconduct yet
proceeding to a representation election, which it lost, a union may
not subsequently urge facts which took place before the election
as grounds for finding an unlawful refusal to bargain. Such knowl-
edge by the union may be inferred from the conduct of employees
*Attorney, Kullman & Lang, New Orleans, Louisiana; Assistant Professor of Law,
Tulane University School of Law.
' NLRB v. Stewart, 207 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1953).
2 Smith Transfer v. NLRB, 204 F. 2d 738 (5th Cir. 1953).
8 110 N.L.R.B. No. 205 (1954).
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acting on behalf of the union.4 But in such cases where an order
to bargain may issue without an election, general interference,
coercion or discrimination respecting union activity, while putting
off recognition to which the union was entitled, is the basis. In
this paper our concern is to see what unilateral action might
provoke such an order because it is in the field of bargaining. In
brief, considering the collective bargaining requirements of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, what changes affecting
employees does management have the exclusive right to make, that
is, without giving the union an opportunity to discuss them?
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act5 makes it unlawful to refuse to
bargain, subject to the provisions of Section 9 (a), wherein it is
provided that the union selected for such bargaining is the exclu-
sive representative of all employees for dealing on "rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."
It is noted in passing that the definition of "labor organization"
is defined in Section 2 (5) of the Act as any organization whose
purpose is to deal with employers concerning "grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions
of work." Section 9 (a) makes it clear, at the same time, that
employees may adjust their individual grievances directly with
management, so, while unions may represent employees in the
handling of grievances, and management, in such cases, must deal
with them thereon, an employer need not discuss with the union
individual grievances presented by employees who do not want
the intervention of the bargaining representative. Nonetheless,
whether or not it is desired by the employer or the grieving em-
ployee, Section 9 (a) requires that the bargaining agent be given
an opportunity to be present when these grievances are adjusted,
and it further provides that such adjustments may not be incon-
sistent with any bargaining contract then in effect.6
Further adverting to the statutory provisions, we find in Sec-
4 Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 111 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (1955).
' All references herein to the act are understood to mean the Labor Management
Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
6 Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950).
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tion 8 (d) that the requirement to bargain means "in good faith,"
but that this does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or make concessions. It also provides that there must be notice of
sixty days prior to modification or termination of a contract, "and
the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either
party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and
conditions in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is
to become effective before such terms and conditions can be re-
opened under the provisions of the contract." Although the latter
provision may at first glance seem to indicate otherwise, the duty
to bargain nonetheless exists throughout the contract subject to
certain exceptions, as will be seen in the discussion, infra, under
the topic "During the Bargaining Process".
SOME PRELIMINARY ITEMS
We do not undertake here to show the various basic defenses
to a charge of refusal to bargain. These may include the follow-
ing: (1) The unit is not appropriate; (2) the union has not been
freely chosen by the majority of the employees in the unit; (3) an
unequivocal demand for bargaining in an appropriate unit has
not been made to the proper party; (4) non-compliance of the
union with the provisions of Section 9 (f), (g) or (h) of the Act.
Nor do we concern ourselves with unilateral action by manage-
ment respecting wages, hours and working conditions in cases
lying outside the Act's coverage or asserted jurisdiction in regard
to supervisors or agricultural employees, and employers placed
by the Board outside its sphere of operations. We will but make
note of the question of when bargaining rights terminate; but it is
appropriate to cite those instances in which by jurisprudence and
the law we have been told that employee or union conduct forfeits
the right to make management bargain, for in these cases the path
is laid open for broad unilateral action.
Where a strike is called in violation of a no-strike contract
clause, the employer is free during the strike to act unilaterally
as in United Elastic Corporation,7 where a wage increase was
7 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949).
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granted without consulting the union; and Elk Lumber Company,s
wherein the employer was excused from the duty to bargain dur-
ing a slow-down. But after the illegal strike or slow-down or other
illegal conduct is over, so long as the union continues to represent
the majority of the employees, the duty to bargain is reinstated.'
Moreover, the illegal conduct of the union or employees may be
offset by provocative unfair labor practices of the employer as in
NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp.,"0 the otherwise illegal conduct of
the employees and union being thereby excused.
Generally, an impasse does not relieve the employer of the obli-
gation to bargain; it merely offers a "cooling off period" at the
end of which, at the demand of either party, collective bargaining
is resumed." Nor does the intervention of a strike authorize the
employer to ignore the bargaining agent,'" though, of course,
where the union loses its majority while engaging in illegal con-
duct' 3 or by replacement of economic strikers 4 it may no longer
have the right to bargain. However, where the union continues to
represent the majority of the employees after the illegal conduct
ends, the obligation to bargain continues. 5 The rule of excuse
during illegal conduct has been extended to provide that a mere
threat to engage in an illegal or unprotected strike or slowdown
during negotiations constitutes grounds for the employer's refusal
to bargain (and may permit him to act unilaterally) until the
threat is disavowed. 6 A contract violation by a union, aside from
strikes, may also relieve an employer from the duty to bargain,
as, for example, a union's refusal to abide by the contract's
seniority provisions. 7 Also, violation of the sixty-day cooling off
provision in Section 8 (d), may free the employer to act as he
will,'" as may also occur when unions engage in business in com-
8 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
9 Higgins, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 184 (1950).
10 251 F. 2d 462 (1954).
11 Jeff ery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F. 2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937).
12 National Gas Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952) ; U. S. Cold Storage Corp. 96 NLRB
1108 (1951).
13 NLRB v. Fansteel, 306 U. S. 240 (1939).
14 Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
15 United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949).
16 Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 216 (1954).
17 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939).
Is Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F. 2d 988 (1949).
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petition with employer," or other disqualifying conduct. In Amer-
ican Laundry Machinery Company," it was held that the em-
ployer's unilateral grant of wage increases and benefits were not
evidences of bad faith where there was reasonable doubt of the
union's continued majority status after the expiration of the certifi-
cation year and the filing of a decertification petition, and the
absence of any prior employer unfair labor practices. But in
NLRB v. International Furniture Company" it was held that a
unilateral grant of paid holidays after the end of the certification
year was unlawful where the benefits were retroactive into the
certification year and there was no evidence that the union aban-
doned its claims to represent the employees or lost its majority
status. And it has now been set at rest that within the certification
year the duty to bargain continues in the absence of unusual cir-
cumstances. Such unusual circumstances do not include loss of
the union's majority without fault of the employer.22 The Board
has thus far recognized only the following as "unusual circum-
stances" sufficient to overcome the presumption of continuing
majority during the certification year: (1) The union's dissolu-
tion,2" (2) transfer of affiliation to another union;24 and (3) a
material change in the bargaining unit.25
DURING THE BARGAINING PROCESS
Whenever the obligation to bargain exists, the critical language
of the Act is that which broadly advises that collective bargaining
embraces "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment."2 But before we turn to an examina-
tion of what particular conduct the Act puts inside this broad
language, we must make certain additional comments necessary to
an understanding thereof.
The theory, of course, is that unilateral employer conduct re-
specting rates of pay, wages, hours, and employment conditions
19 Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. No. 213 (1954).
20 107 N.L.R.B. No. 316 (1954).
21212 F. 2d 431 (5th Cir. 1954).
22 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96 (1954).
28 Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944).
24 Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 935 (1946).
25 Celanese Corp. of America, 73 N.L.R.B. 864 (1947).
2 6 Section 9 (a).
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undermines the bargaining agent's prestige, 7 but the essential
question of whether unilateral changes violate the obligation to
bargain depends on the finding of fact that the employer did or
did not show good faith in the totality of his dealings with the
union. All of the decisions reflect this. For example, in Libby,
McNeill & Libby,2" the unilateral inauguration of an incentive
plan was considered not per se an unfair labor practice without
proof that the increases were a part of a scheme to undermine
the union.
There have been isolated cases, too, where unilateral action
otherwise violative of the duty to bargain has been condoned be-
cause of special circumstances, as in Administrative Decision of
NLRB General Counsel, Case No. 237, February 1, 1952, where
the employer acted on a reasonable interpertation of a state law
regarding contributions to an employees' welfare fund.
Of course, it is well settled that once a proposal has been made
in the course of good faith bargaining, accompanied by a reason-
able attempt to negotiate thereon, the employer is free (normally,
during an impasse) to put it into effect under circumstances that
do not or are not calculated to undermine the prestige of the bar-
gaining representative. In NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Com-
pany29 these factors were pointed out in the dismissal of the
refusal-to-bargain charge based on the granting of benefits during
bargaining without agreement of the union even though an impasse
had not occurred: (1) The representative was notified in advance,
(2) the employees were informed that the representative was not
satisfied with the benefits granted, (3) the grant of benefits was
without prejudice to further negotiations, and (4) there had
been a history of amicable bargaining.
And, again, without an impasse, a unilateral wage increase (or
other change) may under some circumstances be put into effect
where the union is notified in advance and demonstrates its un-
willingness to agree to anything less than its full demands, where
the employees were advised that the matter had been discussed
with the union and care was exerted not to leave the impression
27 Riverside Mfg. Co., 20 N.L.R.B. 394 (1940).
28 65 N.L.R.B. 873 (1946).
29 192 F. 2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951).
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that the employer was withdrawing from negotiations." But, of
course, the unilateral grant of a wage increase, after the proposal
thereof has been left unaccepted, does not authorize, before or
after a bargaining impasse, a greater increase than that offered
,the union." And, when putting into effect a unilateral wage in-
crease previously offered the union, even after an impasse, it must
not be done in such a way as to disparage the bargaining agent
or undermine its prestige.32
Where the employer puts into effect previously offered increases
to try to ward off a strike, 3 or where previously offered higher
rates are made effective for or offered to economic strike replace-
ments once a strike begins, 4 no refusal will be found. But a wage
increase not previously offered the union may not be given to em-
ployees remaining at work in a struck plant, despite the considera-
tion of their exposure to danger, because this tends to discourage
the strike.3" In general, however, it may be said that an employer
may put into effect, unilaterally, changes proposed but rejected
by the union after a reasonable attempt to bargain thereon.
When we talk about various unilateral acts being violations of
the obligation to bargain, we should constantly bear in mind that
we are always talking about conduct engaged in without discussion
with the bargaining agent.
With these preliminaries before us we now examine the uni-
lateral acts and conduct of management which have been held to
violate the obligation to bargain, remembering that "rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment"
is the framework of the field which we are entering.
As one might expect from the broad purposes of the statute to
promote collective bargaining between employers and unions, the
area and subject matter of bargaining have been continually
widened to include almost everything that may affect, directly or
30 W. W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948). See also Majure Transport Co., 95
N.L.R.B. 311 (1951), where the union was notified that the company intended to make
some unilateral wage increases but ignored the notification and did not request dis-
cussion.
s1 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U. S. 217 (1949).
32 Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951).
33 Montgomery Ward & Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1950).
34 Pacific Gamble Robinson v. NLRB, 186 F. 2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950).
at James Thompson & Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 456 (1952).
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indirectly, the income, future, health or convenience of employees.
As will be seen, when there is an established bargaining agent, it
may not be by-passed in any material aspect of the field covered.
Illustrative of the extension of the limits of bargaining are the
decisions prohibiting unilateral action with respect to group health,
accident and life insurance programs,"6 and pensions and retire-
ment plans. 7 These sanctions apply even to the voluntary inaugu-
ration of such benefits.3" An example of the severity of the rule
of prohibition is Montgomery Ward & Company,89 where an un-
fair labor practice was found in the mere substitution of one
insurance agency for another for the handling of a welfare plan,
though there the substitution imposed an additional cost on the
employees affected. Such welfare benefits are "wages," the courts
have said, and there may be neither increases,4" nor may there be
decreases in wages4' by unilateral act.
There are special instances when unilateral action should be
and is excused but it was held in NLRB v. Union Manufacturing
Company4z that rate revision to maintain differentials after an
increase in the minimum under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 is not one of them. Nor does the fact that an overhauling
of the wage structure is necessary merely to conform to "com-
pany policy" permit management to do so unilaterally." Neither
does it matter that a general increase was given simultaneously
in the employer's other plants,44 or that the increase was urgent to
prevent loss of employees to competitors, since it nonetheless
weakens the union's position as the bargaining representative.45
36 Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F. 2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949) ; NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 179 F. 2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950).
3T Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F. 2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U. S.
960 (1949) ; Allied Mills, 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949); Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 85
N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949) ; The Black-Clawson Company, 103 N.L.R.B. 928 (1953).
38 Square D Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 253 (1953).
39 90 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1950).
40 Armstrong & Hand, Inc., 104 N.L.R.B. 420 (1953); Southwestern Wholesale
Grocery Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1485 (1951); Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127
F. 2d 180 (4th Cir. 1942).
41 Franklin Hosiery Mills, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 276 (1949); Jordan Bros. Co., 107
N.L.R.B. No. 148 (1954).
42 200 F. 2d 656 (5th Cir. 1953).
43 V-0 Milling Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 348 (1942).
44 Cookeville Shirt Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 667 (1948).
45 NLRB v. Shannon, 208 F. 2d 545 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Sullivan & Sons Mfg. Corp.,
102 N.L.R.B. 2 (1953).
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Indicative of the precautions that must be taken, Woodruff
d/b/a Atlanta Broadcasting Company46 held that the Act was vio-
lated when an employer put into effect an increase agreed on but
not yet reduced to writing and signed, because thereby the bargain-
ing agent's prestige was undermined by indicating that the em-
ployer, rather than the union, was to be thanked for the raise.
It is different, though, where the union has had a meeting and
approved the increase, even though the contract as a whole is never
consummated because of the failure of the parties to agree on
other terms.47 Also characteristic of the emphasis placed by the
Board on overall good faith bargaining is the case where the
employer makes the slip of granting the wage increase or other
benefit unilaterally during bargaining, then immediately there-
after engages in discussion and considers proposals thereon and
demonstrates its sincerity with respect thereto, especially where it
may be shown that the unilateral action does not have the effect
of and was not intended to discourage union membership or col-
lective bargaining.
48
Where changes in wages, etc., are made while bargaining nego-
tiations are in prolonged "suspension" due to a deadlock on un-
related provisions of the proposed contract, the action has been
held not to have been taken to by-pass the bargaining representa-
tive, the Board declaring: ". .. in the circumstances the respondent
was under no duty to withhold normal action respecting wages
pending consultation with the union... , Another excuse for uni-
lateral pay changes is found in E. A. Laboratories, Inc.,5" where
rates in excess of those permitted by the Wage Stabilization Act
were discontinued.
Sometimes, when the change is not too drastic, the failure of
the bargaining agent to protest it saves the employer from a find-
ing of refusal to bargain, as in Atlanta Journal Company dibla
Radio Station WSB, 5' involving the substitutions of a flat pay
4" 90 N.L.R.B. 808 (1950).
47 Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (1954).
48 Western Printing Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 194 (1941).
49 Montgomery Ward & Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 229 (1942). See also Westchester News-
papers, Inc., 26 N.L.R.B. 630 (1940).
50 80 N.L.R.B. 625 (1948).
5182 N.L.R.B. 832 (1949).
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raise for a bonus system some time after the union had opposed
the bonus system.
And bonuses have also come in for their share of attention.
Apparently, whether one must bargain on bonuses depends on
whether they are truly gifts, rather than some form of remunera-
tion, as where length of service, the previous earnings, efficiency,
etc., of the employee are considered in determining whether the
bonus is given or in arriving at the amount thereof. But where
they are given vicariously, irregularly, wholly and solely within
the discretion of the employer and not based on any particular
standards, they may be "gifts" and therefore outside the area of
required bargaining."
It is no violation, of course, to grant a Christmas bonus where
it is traditional and as long as the union does not ask to bargain
on it or object to it." Moreover, an employer will be absolved
from blame, if it refuses to bargain on the amount of a bonus to
be paid several months away, at Christmas time, when its prac-
tice had been to determine just before Christmas how much it felt
able to pay at that time, if anything.54
Obviously, piece rates, bonus rates, and incentives, generally,
must be and they have been considered to be "wages." And this
is so whether there is involved the inauguration of such a system, 5"
the continuance thereof,56 or reduction therein.57 But management
does not even have the right to determine unilaterally the produc-
tion quotas to be attained by the employees before these incen-
tives go into effect.5" What about work loads of employees, where
no incentives or piece rates are in effect? Is this a management
function, if the only point is that the company is not satisfied
with the amount of work turned out by the employee? This prob.
62 See NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F. 2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952), where the
bonus had been given regularly for many years, based on employee earnings, etc.
53 Texas Foundries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1952).
54 Tower Hosiery Mills, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 658 (1949).
5 Mason & Hughes, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 846 (1949).
56 John W. Bolton & Sons, 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950).
57 Atlantic Metallic Casket Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1225 (1950). See also Epstein d/bfa
Top Mode Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1952).
58 Camp & McInnes, 100 N.L.R.B. 524 (1952); I. B. S. Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1263




ably would also have to be discussed with the union, if requested."
Certainly, the arbitration cases are many where decisions have
been rendered on grievances of employees that they were required
to work too hard under management-fixed standards of production,
and if a thing may become the subject of a grievance, does it not
fall within the field of collective bargaining?
A complaint was issued in Crown-Zellerbach Corporation" after
the employer installed new equipment and set piece rates thereon
unilaterally. The reasons assigned for dismissing the complaint
were that the company had a good bargaining history and that it
discussed the new piece rates with the union after it protested
even though the deed had been done and, as a practical matter,
was over with.
Piece rate problems are vexatious for unions and employers
alike in the bargaining relationship. It is interesting to note there-
fore that there apparently is nothing improper in continuing to
make changes in piece rates on the basis of time studies where the
union is not seeking to bargain on individual rates but, rather,
is trying to work out an overall plan for setting them. Nor is it
improper for management to insist upon an agreement which
would eliminate piece rate grievances during the contract term.
Interesting discussions have surrounded the granting of merit
increases, in which the emphasis has been upon whether these
are "gifts" to individual employees deserving of special considera-
tion. But in the landmark case of NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Com-
pany"i it was held a refusal to bargain to grant merit increases
unilaterally, despite advancement of the theory that the individ-
ual rather than the whole working force was being treated with,
and even though such merit increases had been granted unilater-
ally without objection over a number of years. The court said:
We think the logical deduction to be drawn from the opinions of the
Supreme Court is that .. . the obligation ... to bargain ... includes
the duty to bargain . . . concerning individual merit wage increases.
The labelling of a wage increase as a gratuity does not obviate the fact
that a gratuitous increase on the basis of merit does, in actuality,
-9 But cf. NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL ADmINISTRATIVE RULING, Case No. 799 (1953).
00 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951).
61 165 F. 2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948).
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effectuate changes in rates of pay and wages, which are by the Act
made the subject of collective bargaining.
The court in the Allison case quoted from May Stores Company
v. Labor Board,"2 in which it was said:
Such unilateral action minimizes the influence of collective bargain-
ing. It interferes with the right of self-organization by emphasizing to
the employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining
agent.
We, however, anticipate another subdivision of this article to
say that unilateral periodic individual merit increases can indeed
be given during a contract term where the agreement provides for
minimum and maximum wage rates in each job classification as
well as an elaborate rating system, the contract ceding by infer-
ence or directly that the employer has the right to grant merit
increases and there being a history of acquiescence in such uni-
lateral merit increases for a long period of time, despite the
union's demand that it be consulted before granting such increases
and the refusal thereof.63
Where merit increases follow a policy established before the
union began to organize, there is no refusal to bargain; but this
would not hold up once the union made a demand for bargaining
on such merit pay." Nor is there a violation, of course, where the
union knows about the unilateral grant of merit increases during
negotiations and makes no protest. 65
Among other topics included under the obligation to bargain
on "wages" are overtime and stand-by pay,6 vacation pay and
holiday pay,67 the method of computing such pay, 8 job evalua-
tion,69 stock purchase plans in which employees contribute to the
plan,70 as well as those in which stock is issued without cost to
62326 U. S. 376 (1945).
63 General Controls Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1341 (1950).
64 Southshore Packing Corp. 73 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1947).
65 Frohman Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1954).
66 Southern Pine Electric Cooperative, 104 N.L.R.B. 834 (1953).
67Whitinsville Spinning Ring Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 801 (1951) ; Wheatland Electric
Cooperative, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1119 (1953).
66 Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
69 Montgomery Ward & Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1950) ; Old Line Life Insurance Co.,
96 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951).
70 Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (1954).
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employees with a certain length of service,71 credit unions and
savings and loan funds.72 There are many other topics, too, like
severance pay, the opening or closing of company cafeterias, and
selling products of the employer at a discount, which may fall
within the broadly-construed meaning of "wages".
It is elementary that a unilateral change in working hours is
unlawful.78 But the term "hours of employment" likewise has
been given a liberal construction. It applies to the length of the
work day,74 the length of the work week,75 changes in work
shifts, 76 and rest and lunch periods. 77 It follows, of course, that
the term also applies to work schedules,78 distribution of overtime,
'etc.
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether an item about
which the union wishes to bargain falls under the specific heading
of "wages" or of "hours" or of "other conditions of employment"
within the meaning of Section 9 (a). The Board and the courts
do not always bother to make the subject in controversy speci-
fically fit under one of these express categories, but simply show
that it is a question important to the relationship between em-
ployer and employee, or that it logically belongs or customarily
has been considered in this field.
In Weyerhaueser Timber Company, 9 the Board found a refusal
to bargain in the unilateral increase of prices of meals at isolated
lumber camps. While the employees were not compelled to eat
there, said the Board, they had little choice if they were to work
at those locations. The Board moreover rejected the argument that
"conditions of employment" has no broader meaning than that
perhaps spontaneously suggested by the term "working conditions"
71 United Shoe Machinery Corp., Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1951).
72 But see E-Z Mills, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1039 (1953), in which a unilateral withdrawal
of employer assistance to a credit union was held not unlawful where the union indicated
it did not desire to bargain on the subject. But cf. De Diego Taxi Cabs, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B.
1026 (1954).
7s Oughton v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 486 (3rd Cir. 1941) ; Tennessee Valley Broadcasting
Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 895 (1949).
74 Camp & McInnes, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 524 (1952).
75 Bergen Point Iron Works, 79 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1948).
76 American National Insurance Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 185 (1950).
77 National Grinding Wheel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948) ; Camp & McInnes, Inc.,
100 N.L.R.B. 524 (1952).
78 Danker Motor Sales, 107 N.L.R.B. No. 272 (1954).
79 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949).
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and that it, therefore, only refers to the physical conditions under
which employees are compelled to work rather than to the terms
or conditions under which employment status is afforded or with-
drawn.
The Board's position in this respect must, however, be viewed
today in the light of NLRB v. Bemis Brothers Bag Company,s' in
which the Board was reversed, the Court of Appeals holding that
terms and conditions relating to occupancy of company-owned
houses are not "wages" or "other conditions of employment"
where there is no evidence that the rentals charged are so much
less than those charged for comparable housing in the vicinity as
to be part of wages and the employees are under no compulsion
arising either from express requirement or force of circumstances
to live in the company houses. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reached a different result in Lehigh-Portland Cement Com-
pany,81 where twenty-five per cent of the employees lived in com-
pany houses and the rent was below the prevailing rate, so there
the Board order was enforced. The company-house cases have in-
cluded Board orders declaring unilateral eviction of tenants to be
unlawful,"2 and requiring discussion with the union of lease agree-
ments. 
8
"Conditions of employment" will be found to include just about
everything (other than "wages" and "hours of work," heretofore
discussed) that is normally found in union contracts, and some
things that are not. Is it logical under the foregoing discussion that
the practice of an employer in making personal loans to em-
ployees, and permitting them to repay in small weekly amounts,
might be made the subject of collective bargaining? It is a subject
the employer must bargain on."' Does an employer have the right
to decide, without consulting a union, whether the tools and cloth-
ing of employees shall be kept under the company's lock and key
without unlimited access thereto by the employees? The Board
has held 5 that it substantially changes and prejudices the "condi-
80 206 F. 2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953).
81205 F. 2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953).
82 West Boylston Mfg. Co. of Alabama, 87 N.L.R.B. 807 (1949).
83 Elgin Standard Brick Mfg. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1467 (1950).
84 But cf. Porto Rico Container Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 1570 (1950).
so Pacific Power Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 280 (1949).
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tions of employment" of an employee for the employer to substi-
tute his own lock and key for that of the employee. And so on and
on go the decisions; the unilateral change of pay day by the em-
ployer may provoke an order to bargain thereon, unless the union
knew of the change and did not protest it. 6 Of course, the hiring
and firing of employees is a proper subject for bargaining, as
well as for the grievance procedure once a contract is signed. In
Deena Artware, Inc., 7 there was a refusal to bargain on the dis-
charge of union leaders, and in NLRB v. Acme Air Appliance
Company,"8 it was pointed out that an employer may not deal
directly with strikers for their reinstatement while a union is still
their bargaining agent.8 9 It is clear, too, that the union should
be advised of and given an opportunity to bargain on the recall
of laid off employees,9" as well as the impending lay off of em-
ployees,91 even though the lay offs will result from a complete
shut down of the business for economic reasons.92
Moreover, a company may not move its plant to another loca-
tion without giving the union a chance to discuss the removal and
obtain the names and location of new owners, if any.93 While there
is no obligation to consult with the union before going out of
business for non-discriminatory reasons,94 the certification of a
union and the obligation to bargain continues after a bona fide sale
since there is no reason to believe the employees will change their
attitude regarding the choice of a representative merely because
the identity of their employer has changed.95
The Act, as already observed, permits adjustment of grievances
with individual employees. The express exception of individual
grievances from the compulsory bargaining scheme is significant,
86 But ci. Betty Brooks Company, 99 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1952).
87 86 N.L.R.B. 732 (1949).
s8 117 F. 2d 417 (2d Cir. 1941).
89 But cf. NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939).
90 West Bolyston Mfg. Co. of Alabama, 87 N.L.R.B. 808 (1949).
91 U. S. Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951).
92 Cf. Eva-Ray Dress Mfg. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 361 (1950).
93 Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948); Brown Truck & Trailer Manu-
facturing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953) ; California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B.
1436 (1952).
04 Walter Holm & Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1169 (1949) ; E-Z Mills, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1039
(1953).
95 NLRB v. Armato, 199 F. 2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952).
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and it offers broad possibilities for unilateral action which may
become important where strong minorities exist within contracting
unions or where a device is sought to set up a buffer between the
employees and outside organizations. In one case there was no
bargaining agent and the employer dealt with a committee elected
by the employees to represent them in the handling of grievances."
The Court of Appeals, reversing the Board, indicated this to be
outside the field exclusively reserved for collective bargaining
and, therefore, cleared the employer of a charge of interference
with and domination of a labor organization.
In Globe-Union, Inc.,97 the employer adjusted a rate grievance
with an employee without notifying the union, but the employer
had frequently done this after posting the proposed rates on the
bulletin board. The union was aware of the practice and so it was
held that there was no violation. But Leader News Company" held
that this failure to protest the practice of individual grievance set-
tlements, outside the presence of the union representative, does not
free the employer from the obligation to see that the union has an
opportunity to have a representative present in the adjustment of
individual grievances in the future. Long ago, in NLRB v. North
American Aviation, Inc.,99 there was court approval of unilateral
establishment of separate procedure for settlement of grievances
presented by employees individually, despite the grievance pro.
cedure in the contract, in view of the proviso in Section 9 (a).
Although the Board unquestionably has the power to order man-
agement to bargain on subjects covered by contract grievance
procedures, and the Act provides that the Board's power in this
and other respects "shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, law, or otherwise,"1 ' the Board has laid down the re-
quirement that unions first resort to arbitration under their con-
tracts before pursuing unfair labor practice charges.' In Cali-
06 NLRB v. Associated Machines, Inc., 219 F. 2d 433 (6th Cir. 1955).
97 97 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1952).
98 90 N.L.R.B. 119 (1952).
99 136 F. 2d 898 (9th Cir. 1943).
100 Section 10 (a).
101 Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943). But cf. NLRB v.
Standard Oil Co., 196 F. 2d 892 (6th Cir. 1952).
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fornia Portland Cement Company'02 certain work was removed to
another city. The union filed a grievance under the existing con-
tract, but the employer refused to discuss it after a charge of re-
fusal to bargain was filed with the Board. In ordering the company
to bargain on the question, the Board distinguished this case from
those where the union failed to invoke the available contract
grievance procedure. In Bethlehem Steel Company' 8 the company
wanted to let union representatives be present at the adjustment
of grievances only if the aggrieved employees so elected. The union
would not agree to this, so the company went ahead and adjusted
such grievances anyway without the presence of the union repre-
sentatives. The Board found this is to be a violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (5).
Some interesting questions have arisen, also, in connection with
bargaining over working rules, which are a subject of bargain-
ing.14 In Tower Hosiery Mills, Inc.,"0 5 the Board found a viola-
tion in the posting of working rules without consulting the union,
even though the rules were technically in existence, where they
had not been enforced for several years and had never before
been reduced to writing. However, it found no violation where the
rules had actually been in effect and enforced for some time but
had just never been reduced to writing, and they were now posted
without first consulting the union." 6 Nor is there a violation in
the unilateral adoption of a rule prohibiting telephone calls during
working hours,'07 which follows the principle approved in Peyton
Packing Company,' that "working time is for work" and that
the Act does not prevent an employer from making reasonable
rules covering the conduct of employees while at work.
Also covered by Board orders to bargain, denying the right of
unilateral action therein, are the subjects of employee discipline,
the promotion of employees from one rank and file job to an-
102 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952).
103 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950).
104 NLRB v. Union Manufacturing Co., 200 F. 2d 656 (5th Cir. 1953).
10 81 N.L.R.B. 658 (1949).
106 Mason & Hughes, 86 N.L.R.B. 848 (1949).
107 National Grinding Wheel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948).
108 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943).
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other,10 9 or their demotion."0 And the unilateral transfer of em-
ployees is also a violation of the Act,"' as may also be true of
the discontinuance of a department."'
Much thought has been devoted to the right of unions, under
the Act, to insist upon bargaining over the subcontracting of work.
Unions have been wary of the motives of employers in parcelling
out production to other companies, especially where it has directly
affected employment of their members, and there are many arbi-
tration cases involving grievances of this nature. Indeed, it would
seem that the fate of this question must rest with the arbitrators,
unless the right to subcontract is reserved to management in the
labor agreement itself. However, in Timkin Roller Bearing Com-
pany," 8 the company had subcontracted without objection for
many years, including a long period of contractual relations with
the union. The union then struck, in violation of the no-strike
clause of its contract, alleging refusal to bargain on grievances
(including subcontracting). It was held that "subcontracting" fell
within the broad managerial clause of the contract, even though
it did not specifically refer to subcontracts, when considered with
the long practice of subcontracting by management without objec-
tion by the union. The Board, in The Hughes Tool Company,""
where there was involved a management rights clause reserving
all previous rights not relinquished in the contract, upheld, citing
the Timken decision, the unilateral right of the company to sub-
contract because a prior contract had expressly vested that right
in the company. Another decision, NLRB v. Houston Chronicle
Publishing Company,"5 reversing the Board, held that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the conclusion that the purpose
of a change in the newspaper's distribution system from handling
directly by employees to handling by independent contractors was
to defeat organization of its employees. But we may infer even
109 NLRB v. W. T. Grant Co., 199 F. 2d 711 (9th Cir. 1951).
110 Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F. 2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947).
111 The Hughes Tool Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 208 (1952).
112 But cl. National Gas Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952).
-3 161 F. 2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
114 100 N.L.R.B. 208 (1952).
1'5 211 F. 2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
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from that decision that once the bargaining relationship is estab-
lished such subcontracting may well be within the area in which
the employer is required to deal.
UNILATERAL FREEDOM BY CONTRACT: THE MANAGEMENT
RIGHTS CLAUSE
From all that has been said thus far it would appear that where
there are no exceptional circumstances, management may be hope-
lessly restricted if the unions choose to insist on bargaining on
the seemingly numberless subjects that can be raised. But this
is not so. In fact, management can retain or regain its freedom to
the extent that the use of its superior economic strength is con-
sistent with good faith. This is the net result of the Supreme Court's
decision in the celebrated American National Insurance Company
case.11 Here the company insisted on a management functions
clause listing matters such as promotions, discipline and work
scheduling as its responsibility alone, and excluding such sub-
jects from arbitration. The Court held this not to be a refusal to
bargain. This is what needs emphasis: A union may waive its
statutory right-to what extent we may not be sure, but it can
agree to exclude important wage, hours and employment condi-
tions questions from bargaining for the duration of its contract.
This the Board itself recognized a decade ago in May Department
Stores."'
The duty to bargain is absolute, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit said in Timken Roller Bearing Company v. NLRB,"'
but "it may be channeled and directed by contractual agreement."
As far back as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,"9 under
which the validity of the NLRA was sustained, the Supreme Court
said that the Act "does not compel agreements between employers
and employees." From that point forward the question of "what
is good faith" when the parties have failed to reach an agreement
has been litigated in hundreds of cases. But the decisions of the
Board time and again made it appear that management had to
116 NLRB v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395 (1952).
117 59 N.L.R.B. 976.
118 161 F. 2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
119 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
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yield to some extent on certain fundamental issues. The courts fre-
quently disagreed, however, declaring that the Board's functions
do not include the dictation of terms of the agreement though its
responsibility does embrace determination of whether there has
been good faith. This, of course, is the law today.
The Supreme Court said in the American National Insurance
case:
Congress provided expressly that the Board should not pass upon
the desirability of the substantive terms of labor agreements. Whether
a contract should contain a clause of fixing standards for such matters
is an issue for determination across the bargaining table, not by the
Board. If the latter approach is agreed upon, the extent of union and
management participation in the administration of such matters is itself
a condition of employment to be settled by bargaining.
There appears to be no limit on how far an employer may go
in insisting, and a union in agreeing, that the employer-employee
relationship and the incidents thereto may be left within the exclu-
sive control of management-except this, as is repeatedly empha-
sized here, that the overall circumstances show good faith. This,
of course, requires serious examination of the position taken
with respect to each item whose control the employer seeks. One
test, certainly, is whether the position assumed on each such detail
is supported by logic. It does not have to be persuasive necessarily,
but there probably would have to be apparent justification-as
there is in the demand in the American National Insurance case
that promotions, discipline and work schedules be left entirely to
management's discretion. But what is good faith in one case may
not be so in another, and facts and figures might well have to be
presented to support particular views in the bargaining process
itself.
It is readily seen from this and from examination of the other
extreme that the American National Insurance decision does not
give the employer absolute control of the bargaining process when
the union is not strong enough to stage a successful strike.
120
That there are elements of the employer-employee relationship
120See Dixie Corp., 105 N.L.R.B. 390 (1953). But cf. Majure Transport Co. v.
NLRB, 198 F. 2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 201 F. 2d 36 (4th Cir. 1953).
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which may not be reserved by management nor waived by unions
is quickly apparent when it is observed that while the right to solicit
members on company property during nonworking hours may be
given up, never may a labor organization yield the privilege of
employees to continue their union membership.
It is conceivable, however, that a concession large enough in
some circumstances, and no concession at all under other condi-
tions, both might justify the insistence of management upon
reservation by contract to its sole judgment of nearly every phase
of the area normally relegated to bargaining.
There can be no assurance, on the other hand, that there is any-
thing in the sphere of management activities, with the few excep-
tions noted, that is outside the scope of the right of the employees'
representative to bargain thereon. Suppose the employees object
to working on a certain product because they consider contact
with the materials to be injurious to their health? Does the union
have the right to say what or how management is to manufacture?
By thumbing through almost any volume of the decisions of arbi-
trators it will be seen readily that employers run afoul of union
grievances when they seek to determine the requirements, stand-
ards and qualifications necessary to perform jobs; the number,
length and scheduling of shifts; all kinds of other operating
changes, the choice of personnel, and-as seen throughout this
discussion-a myriad of other things which are of obvious impor-
tance to good business management.
The answer, then, to the problems of management under the
National Labor Relations Act, if there be one, seems to have been
found in its relative freedom at the bargaining table-in its right
to bargain for sweeping and effective management prerogatives
clauses.
Some such clauses list specific matters over which exclusive con-
trol is reserved. Others simply contain a general reservation of all
rights that "normally reside in management" or that have not been
specifically bargained away by express coverage in the contract.
The weakness of the general clause, of course, is that it is subject
to interpretation in arbitration.
Even generalized management rights clauses may indirectly
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enable employers to increase the scope of unilateral action, how-
ever. In the Timken Roller Bearing case there was a grievance pro.
cedure and a management clause which simply provided that
there was vested exclusively in the company "management of the
work and direction of the working forces, including the right...
to relieve employees from duty because of. . . legitimate rea-
sons... When the union demanded that it be consulted on the
subject of subcontracting of work, and a strike during the course
of the contract which contained the above clauses ensued, the
court said:
The declination to confer with the union upon the subject of sub-con-
tracting . . . involved the coverage of the management clause of the
agreement. The company viewed the subject matter of the union's pro-
posal as within its exclusive prerogative. It had always engaged in sub-
contracting, it had been engaged in sub-contracting at the time the
first collective bargaining contract with the union had been con-
cluded, it was engaged in sub-contracting when the 1943 contract
went into effect. No grievances had been filed with respect to it if we
except the abortive grievance in July, which was never pressed. The
practical construction put upon the management clause by both parties
was, without controversy in the record, that sub-contracting was a
function of management. Be that as it may-the dispute as it finally
developed, was a dispute as to the interpretation of the management
clause, and the contract specifically provided that such disputes were
to be settled within the grievance procedure, and if they failed, by arbi-
tration.
The court then went on to hold that since the duty to bargain
may be channeled and directed by contractual agreement, this was
not a case to be brought under Section 8 (a) (5), but, rather one
for the grievance and arbitration process.
The role of the arbitrator may become more and more impor-
tant because of what we have just said. But it should be borne in
mind that management can, by further trading in the bargaining
negotiations, limit by contract the authority of the arbitrator, too.
This makes advisable repetition here of the question: Should
arbitration, if provided for, be required to determine whether
there has in fact been a violation of the contract before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board may proceed with a charge that
unilateral conduct constitutes a refusal to bargain? It would ap-
1955]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
pear from the decisions above discussed that the grievance pro.
cedure must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the
facilities of the NLRB. However, the General Counsel has pro-
ceeded initially to dispose of cases where the unilateral action
appeared to him not to violate the bargaining agreement.12'
There remains for discussion the principles laid down in NLRB
v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co."22 and related cases which hold that
the duty to bargain during the life of the contract does not include
issues either (1) discussed before execution of or (2) contained
in the contract. Section 8 (d) of the Act required interpetation
therein, and the court said:
The purpose of this provision is, apparently, to give stability to
agreements governing industrial relations. But, the exception thus
created necessarily conflicts with the general purpose of the Act,
which is to require employers to bargain as to employee demands
whenever made to the end that industrial disputes may be resolved
peacefully without resort to drastic measures likely to have an injurious
effect upon commerce, and the general purpose should be given effect
to the extent there is no contrary provision. Since the language chosen
to describe this exception is precise and explicit, "terms and conditions
contained in a contract for a fixed period," we do not think it relieves
an employer of the duty to bargain as to subjects which were neither
discussed nor embodied in any of the terms and conditions of the
contract.
But if reliance is had on waiver by contract, there must be
clear and unmistakable showing of such. In E. W. Scripps Com-
pany,123 the Board said that although it has held that "a union
may waive certain statutory rights by genuine collective bargain-
ing," it has also asserted that such a waiver will not be readily
inferred, for: "We are reluctant to deprive employees of any
of the rights guaranteed them by the Act in the absence of a clear
and unmistakable showing of a waiver of such rights."' 24
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It is not necessarily true that unless management obtains writ-
ten agreement, at least in general terms, permitting it to engage
121 NLRB GENERAL COUNs.IL ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGs Nos. 793 and 843 (1953).
122 196 F. 2d 680 (2d Cir. 1951).
12394 N.L.R.B. 227 (1951).
124 Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
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in cerain unilateral action, it may have to consult the union on
very nearly every phase of its business operation. While there
is little in the National Labor Relations Act which saves employer
rights to unilateral action besides Section 8 (b) (1) (B), for-
bidding interference with management's right to select its own
officials to represent it in bargaining negotiations, there is much
in the general body of jurisprudence over the years to guide pos-
sible future thinking of where the line may be drawn even with-
out management clauses. An example of this general jurispru-
dence is Opera on Tour, Inc., v. Weber,'25 wherein it was held
that an endeavor to prevent the use of a mechanical device "bears
no reasonable relation to wages, hours of employment ... or any
other condition of employment," although, of course, the National
Labor Relations Act was not construed there. In some cases the
attempt of an employer to substitute a mechanical device for hand
labor may very well be a legitimate subject of collective bargain-
ing. But the point made here is simply that there are perhaps many
things, as the Supreme Court pointed out in American National
Insurance Company, supra, and the Board inferred in Dixie Corp.,
supra, which employers may do unilaterally despite union objec-
tions thereto, simply because they are not traditionally found in
bargaining in the industry or common to "all collective bargaining
principles, or, to put it another way, because these things have by
tradition been regarded as "management prerogatives". The posi-
tion taken by the NLRB General Counsel that promotion of em-
ployees to supervisory positions is an exclusive function of man-
agement foreshadows further development along this line."2 6
125 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N.E. 2d 349 (1941).
126 NLRB GENERAL CouNsEL ADMINISTRATIVE RULING, Case No. 825 (1953).
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